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ABSTRACT
This paper measures the effects of real estate brokerage services provided to sellers, other than MLS
listings, on the terms and timing of home sales. It is not obvious that sellers benefit from those services.
On the one hand, brokers offer potentially useful knowledge and expertise. On the other hand, because
the relationship between the homeowner and the broker resembles a classical principal-agent problem,
the broker may not deploy services in ways that promote the seller’s interests. Yet as long as valuable
MLS listings are bundled with brokerage services, homeowners may use brokers even if the agency
costs exceed the benefits of brokers’ knowledge and expertise. Thus, quantification of the net value
of brokerage services other than MLS listings bears directly on the recent policy debate over the desirability
unbundling of MLS listings. We estimate the effect of a seller’s decision to use a broker on list prices,
selling prices, and speed of sale for a real estate market with an unusual and critical characteristic:
it has a single open-access listing service that is used by essentially all sellers, regardless of whether
they employ brokers. Our central finding is that, when listings are not tied to brokerage services, a
seller’s use of a broker reduces the selling price of the typical home by 5.9 to 7.7 percent, which indicates
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Real estate brokers typically provide sellers with bundles of services, most of which are 
ostensibly aimed at improving the terms at which homes are sold and helping homeowners find 
buyers more quickly.
1  Traditionally, access to the Multiple Listing Service (MLS), a pooled da-
tabase of homes for sale that is owned and operated by an association of local real estate brokers, 
has been an important component of that bundle.  Other components of the traditional brokerage 
bundle that potentially affect the terms and timing of a sale include market information and rec-
ommendations pertaining to the appropriate asking price,
2 promotional services (preparing a 
home for sale, circulating flyers, placing advertisements, holding open houses, and recommend-
ing the home to individual buyers), the screening of prospective buyers, the facilitation and acce-
leration of matches between buyers and sellers,
3 and assistance with negotiations.
4   
The object of this paper is to measure the effects of real estate brokerage services pro-
vided to sellers, other than MLS listings, on the terms and timing of home sales.  It is not obvious 
that sellers benefit from those services.  On the one hand, brokers offer potentially useful know-
ledge and expertise.  On the other hand, because the relationship between the homeowner and the 
broker resembles a classical principal-agent problem, the broker may not deploy services in ways 
that promote the seller’s interests.  While appropriately structured compensation schemes may 
alleviate the principal-agent problem to some degree (see, e.g., the recent survey by Miceli, Pan-
cak, and Sirmans, 2007), significant conflicts remain.  As Levitt and Syverson (2008) emphasize, 
an agent “has strong incentives to sell the house quickly, even at a substantially lower price.”  
Their empirical analysis shows that homes owned by agents sell for nearly four percent more and 
stay on the market roughly nine days longer than other comparable houses.  Similarly, Ruther-
ford, Springer, and Yavas (2005) find that “real estate agents receive a premium of 3.0–7.0% 
when selling their own condominiums in comparison to similar client owned condominiums” by 
                                                 
1 Brokers frequently provide other services that do not directly impact the terms or timing of sales.  For example, 
they help with paperwork and legal documentation, and provide referrals to mortgage lenders.  However, those ser-
vices tend to be secondary. 
2 Brokers argue that they “offer professional advice and objective insight” (Evans, 2003), while homes sold by own-
er “often are priced too high and may not sell until the price is reduced, which can turn into an unnecessarily long 
drawn-out process” (Kossen, 2000). 
3 See, e.g., Salant (1991). 
4 According to the National Association of Realtors, brokers are “trained to negotiate the best possible prices and 
terms” (Evans, 2003).   2
waiting longer to sell.
5  While those studies shed light on the magnitude of agency costs (i.e., the 
extent to which the deployment of brokerage services departs from the first-best), they do not tell 
us how those costs compare to the benefits flowing from a broker’s knowledge and expertise.  
Consequently, they do not answer the question posed at the outset of this paragraph.   
The importance of the question addressed in this paper is most readily apparent within the 
context of the recent policy debate over service bundling in real estate brokerage.  As long as 
valuable MLS listings are bundled with brokerage services, homeowners may use brokers even if 
the agency costs exceed the benefits of brokers’ knowledge and expertise.  In that case, unbun-
dling would benefit homeowners and promote efficiency.  In practice, a small but growing num-
ber of brokers now offer to place clients’ homes in the MLS for a fixed fee.
6  Yet in many juris-
dictions established brokers have resisted pressures to unbundle MLS listings from other servic-
es.  In some cases they have pressed for “minimum service” laws that prevent agents from offer-
ing MLS-only options.  As of 2007, eight states had such laws in place.
7  Some states have also 
adopted licensing requirements that impede the entry of non-traditional real estate brokers.   
Where such laws are not in force, some MLSs have adopted their own rules and procedures to 
prevent or at least discourage unbundling.
8  Though the internet increasingly provides alterna-
tives to MLS databases (at least in some jurisdictions), the U.S. Federal Trade Commission ob-
served as recently as November 2009 that “[t]he MLS is generally acknowledged to be a superior 
platform for matching home buyers and sellers.”
9  Thus, the practice of bundling MLS listings 
with other real estate brokerage services handicaps homeowners who wish to sell their homes 
either completely independently (“for sale by owner” or FSBO transactions) or without the ancil-
lary services of a listing broker.  As a result, that practice has become the subject of debate, liti-
gation, and legislative action.  Both the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice 
                                                 
5 In a similar vein, Huang and Rutherford (2007) find that properties sold by realtors – that is, members of the Na-
tional Association of Realtors – on the MLS sell for more (and more quickly) than those sold by agents without that 
designation. 
6 The fee is generally in the range of $200 to $900.  The homeowner may then contract with the listing broker for 
other sales services (which are usually provided in exchange for a smaller commission) or sell the home without 
those services.  In the latter case, the homeowner may pay a “Buyer’s Agent Commission” to a broker who brings in 
a buyer, or avoid commissions altogether by finding a buyer independently. 
7  Alabama, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Texas, and Utah had minimum service laws.  New Mexico 
passed and then rescinded a minimum service law, and other states have actively debated that alternative.  See Ma-
gura (2007) and Federal Trade Commission (2007). 
8 For further discussion, see Magura (2007) and Federal Trade Commission (2007).  
9 This passage appears in a recent decision by the Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission concerning the 
practices of Realcomp II Ltd.; see Kovacic (2009).   3
have taken active roles in challenging the practice and the laws that support it.
10  They argue that 
bundling reduces competition from non-traditional channels of home sales, and essentially com-
pels many homeowners to purchase unwanted services (other than MLS listings). 
The task of quantifying the separate impact of brokerage services provided to sellers, oth-
er than MLS listings, is challenging precisely because bundling has been so prevalent.  While a 
number of previous studies have examined the impact of real estate brokerage,
11 they generally 
make no attempt to separate the effects of MLS listings from those of other services.  For exam-
ple, Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Magné (2009) compare sales of MLS-listed homes sold through 
traditional full-service brokers to sales of homes listed on a web-based FSBO service.  Their 
analysis is noteworthy because their data set is reasonably large, contains many FSBO transac-
tions, and spans a seven year period, which allows them to control for both home and household 
fixed effects.
12  However, analyses of that type inherently cannot reveal the separate effects of 
non-MLS brokerage services.
13  The policy question calls instead for a comparison between 
MLS-listed homes sold through full-service brokers, and MLS-listed FSBOs.  Notably, the work-
ing paper version of the Hendel et al. study mentions that the relative scarcity of listings by li-
mited-service brokers as of year-end 2004 precluded an analysis of MLS-only versus full-service 
listings.   
                                                 
10 For example, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina (Columbia Division) ruled in favor the 
government in U.S. v. Consolidated Mutliple Listing Services (Case No. 3:08-CV-01786-SB, Final Judgement is-
sued August 27, 2009) overturning the discriminatory rules of an MLS in Columbia, SC, that prevented various 
practices including unbundling.  See http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f249600/249614.htm.   
11 Doiron, Shilling, and Sirmans (1985) and Frew and Jud (1987) find that homes sell for more when the seller uses 
a broker.  Kamath and Yantek (1982), Colwell, Lauschke, and Yavas (1992), and Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Magné 
(2009) find no effect.  Based on a matching model, Yavas and Colwell (1995) argue that the effects of using a bro-
ker should be heterogeneous across sellers.  Liao and Chang (2005) find that broker price effects are indeed hetero-
geneous, raising the price of homes at the lower end of the distribution but lowering the price of more expensive 
ones. 
12 Prior studies generally examined cross-sectional correlations, a strategy that offers little opportunity to control 
convincingly for the fact that the use of a broker is highly correlated with the characteristics of homes and home-
owners. In most markets, FSBO sellers constitute a small, highly selected group with potentially unusual characte-
ristics and inclinations:  only 17% of sellers forego the use of an agent (National Association of Realtors, 2003); 
during the first quarter of 2004, 44% of all FSBO homes were never placed on the open market, as the buyer and 
seller knew each other in advance (Evans, 2003); and FSBO sellers tend to be older and less wealthy (National As-
sociation of Realtors, 2002).  Some prior studies employ sample selection corrections, but identification is driven 
entirely by functional form assumptions rather than exclusion restrictions. Also, some earlier studies employed data 
samples that were extremely small and somewhat peculiar.  For example, Doiron, Shilling, and Sirmans (1985) ex-
amined 134 transactions in two condominium complexes, while Kamath and Yantek studied 118 transactions. 
13 If one is willing to accept without evidence the assumption that MLS-listings lead to higher sales prices than the 
non-MLS listings studied by Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Magné (2009), then their finding that the use of a seller’s 
broker has no impact on sales price would imply that services other than MLS listings collectively have an offsetting 
negative impact on sales price.  Of course, the confidence interval of the effect they estimate includes positive val-
ues, so the preceding implication only follows for their point estimate.   4
The analysis of Johnson, Springer, and Brockman (2005) attempts to speak more directly 
to the question that motivates our study, in that they compare the selling prices of MLS-listed 
homes and “non-traditional” broker-marketed homes that were not listed in the MLS.  On its face 
such a comparison would appear to reveal the separate value of an MLS listing.  However, it is 
not clear whether brokerage contracts are otherwise similar for MLS-listed and non-MLS-listed 
homes; hence, measured differences in sales prices may reflect a combination of effects.  It also 
readily apparent that the non-traditional transactions, which represent less than five percent of 
their sample, constitute a highly selected subsample, and the authors’ cross-sectional regressions 
make no allowance for the likely selectivity bias.  Thus, the proper interpretation of the study’s 
central finding – that selling prices for brokered homes are six percent higher when the home is 
not MLS-listed – is obscure.   
In this paper, we estimate the effect of a seller’s decision to use a broker on list prices, 
selling prices, and speed of sale for a real estate market with an unusual and critical characteris-
tic: it has a single open-access listing service that is used by essentially all sellers, regardless of 
whether they employ brokers.
14  The market consists of roughly 800 houses and condominiums 
located in a collection of largely contiguous neighborhoods on Stanford University land.  Be-
cause ownership of the homes is limited to Stanford faculty and some senior staff,
15 the MLS 
plays no role.  Instead, the Faculty Staff Housing (FSH) Office maintains a free listing service, 
so that listings are inherently unbundled from brokerage services.  As in other markets, brokers 
are compensated through standard commissions (historically in the range of five to six percent), 
so the usual principal-agent problems are present. Consequently, by analyzing this market, we 
can identify the separate effects of brokerage services other than MLS listings.   
Studying Stanford University housing offers several additional advantages.  We have data 
on all home sales over a 27 year period, during which the quality of the neighborhoods remained 
approximately constant due to the special nature of the market.  The data also span a major re-
gime shift: brokered transactions were relatively rare during the 1980s but became increasingly 
common during the 1990s and have accounted for roughly half of all sales in recent years (see 
Figure 1).  As a result, neither FSBO nor brokered transactions are exceptional.  There is anec-
                                                 
14 Throughout this paper, we use the term “market” somewhat loosely, and not in the formal sense employed, for 
example, in antitrust analyses. 
15 Stanford enforces this restriction by retaining ownership of the land.  Stanford provides the homeowner with a 
long-term land lease involving modest monthly payments.   5
dotal evidence that this transition was driven by the aggressive marketing efforts of several real-
tors rather than by a shift in sellers’ preferences.  Because the data cover a relatively long time 
period, they include multiple transactions not only for the same home, but also for the same par-
ty.  In many cases, the pertinent transactions span the regime shift.  Therefore, we are able to as-
sess whether correlations between the use of a broker and the terms or timing of a sale reflect 
spurious relationships with unobserved characteristics of sellers or their homes, and to purge our 
estimates of such effects.  Concerns about unobserved heterogeneity are also ameliorated to 
some extent by the fact that the population of buyers and sellers is relatively homogeneous, at 
least in comparison with the general population. 
Overall, there is a strong positive correlation between selling prices and the seller’s use of 
a broker.  However, that correlation reflects a selection effect: homes with value-enhancing cha-
racteristics (e.g., greater size) are more likely to sell through brokers.  Because brokers earn more 
from the sale of more valuable homes, that pattern may reflect targeted efforts to obtain valuable 
listings.  When one conditions on the observed features of a home (by running a regression), the 
correlation essentially vanishes.  To control in addition for the unobserved features of a home, 
we add home fixed effects, and in some specifications we also allow for the possibility that pric-
es may have changed over time at different rates in different market segments (e.g., that the pric-
es of high-end homes, which are more frequently sold through brokers, may have risen or fallen 
relative to those of low-end homes).  Based on these preferred specifications, we conclude that a 
seller’s use of a broker in this setting reduces the selling price of the typical home by 5.9 to 7.7 
percent (based on point estimates), which indicates that agency costs exceed the advantages of 
brokers’ knowledge and expertise by a wide margin.  In all of these specifications, we reject the 
hypothesis that the broker effect equals zero at a high level of confidence.
16  Separately, we find 
no evidence that the lower prices received by sellers who use brokers are attributable to correla-
tions with unobserved household characteristics such as preferences or negotiation skills.  Our 
analysis also suggests that a seller’s use of a broker may reduce the initial asking price and acce-
lerate the sale, but those findings are supported with less statistical confidence. 
Why do sellers use brokers if doing so reduces a home’s selling price?  One possibility is 
that sellers place sufficient value on convenience or the speed of sale.  Given the magnitude of 
                                                 
16 For all but one such specification we reject that hypothesis at the 95% level of confidence or higher.  For the re-
maining (and most restrictive) specification, which does not allow prices to follow different time paths based on 
home quality, we reject it at the 90% level of confidence.    6
the measured effect plus the broker’s commission (which total nearly $100,000 for the average 
home in our sample), we doubt that this explanation is valid.  Another possibility is that sellers 
are poorly informed about the effects of brokers’ services.  There is some anecdotal support for 
that view.  An earlier version of this paper was provided to the FSH Office in late 2006 and cir-
culated among homeowners.  As seen in Figure 1, the fraction of sellers using brokers plum-
meted from 59.5% in 2006 to only 28.6% in 2007. 
As with all studies that focus on usefully unusual settings, there is a question of generali-
zability and external validity.  While we would not suggest that our numerical estimates can be 
applied directly to the general population, there are nevertheless good reasons to think that the 
Stanford housing market provides a valid laboratory for studying the effects of interest.  We dis-
cuss that issue at some length in Section 2.  While we do not claim that the setting is perfectly 
representative, it is nevertheless worth studying because it allows us to provide the only available 
estimates of sellers’ net benefits from using brokers when listing services are unbundled, thereby 
informing an important policy question (concerning the effects of bundling of MLS listings with 
other brokerage services).    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the setting and 
our data, and addresses the issue of representativeness.  Sections 3, 4, and 5 evaluate the effects 
of a seller’s broker on, respectively, selling prices, initial asking prices, and time to sale.  Section 
6 describes some sensitivity analyses and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. SETTING AND DATA 
The data used in this paper were generously provided by Stanford University’s FSH Of-
fice.  Sales data and certain home characteristics are available as far back as the 1940s, but in-
formation relating to the use of brokers is available only through monthly sales circulars distri-
buted by the FSH office, which are archived back to January 1980.  We infer the use of a broker 
from the contact information provided in the housing listings. Altogether, 1,064 sales were rec-
orded between January 1980 and January 2008, of which 794 appear in the sales circulars. This 
discrepancy is attributable primarily to two factors: some sales involved land used for new con-
struction, and some were sold off-market without being listed. We dropped twenty observations 
with incomplete data for purchase price, construction date, or home characteristics. We also   7
dropped nineteen observations listing Stanford University as the buyer or seller; including those 
observations does not significantly alter our results, but their prices appear to be atypical.
17  
These exclusions leave us with 755 observations, of which 133 involved brokers.
18 Some homes 
were removed from the FSH listings prior to a sale, only to reappear in subsequent listings, most 
within one year.  If the home reappeared in the listings within 36 months of withdrawal, we 
treated it as having remained on the market since its initial listing.  Roughly a dozen homes were 
re-listed after 36 months; we treated those as new listings. 
  Other variables used in our analysis measure characteristics of the property, including the 
number of bedrooms and bathrooms, site acreage, square footage, dummies indicating the pres-
ence of a study or a pool, the age of the home at the time of sale (calculated using its date of con-
struction), and neighborhood indicators.
19  We include a dummy variable indicating sales 
through estates, as well as year dummies to account for variations in market conditions.  In some 
specifications, we also control for the length of time the seller had lived in the home at the time 
of sale.
20  That variable presumably proxies for the seller’s age or attachment to the home, and 
possibly for the condition of the property.  Its use further limits our sample to 691 transactions, 
of which 129 involved a broker.  Generally, our results are robust with respect to the combina-
tion of variables used.  
We also have some information on the characteristics of the buyers and sellers.  We were 
able to determine the ages of 585 sellers and 720 buyers, as well as the academic department af-
filiation for 625 sellers and 739 buyers.  We do not observe directly whether buyers were 
represented by brokers.
21  
                                                 
17 Among other things, the selling prices for those homes rarely differ from the asking prices. 
18 Eighteen buyers switched from FSBO to using a broker over the course of listing their property, while five 
switched from using a broker to FSBO. For our analysis of the initial asking price, we treat the seller as using a bro-
ker if it did so when initially listing the property; for our analysis of the selling price and time on the market, we 
treat the seller as using a broker if it did so at the time of sale.  Dropping these observations does not significantly 
alter our results.  
19 Numerous studies (MacDonald, 1996; Palmquist, 1984; Parsons, 1986, and others) have demonstrated the impor-
tance of these characteristics in determining the price of a home.  Two of the neighborhood indexes correspond to 
condominium complexes.  Because all condominiums are in one of these two complexes, it is not necessary to in-
clude a separate dummy variable indicating whether the home is a house or condominium. 
20 We calculate this variable by determining the last date of sale for the same property.  In some cases, that informa-
tion is unavailable.   
21 Levitt & Syverson (2005) found that the absence of a buyer’s agent “has a negligible impact on sale price.” Simi-
larly, Zumpano, Elder, and Baryla (1996) model the buyer’s decision to use a broker and, accounting for this selec-
tion, find that there is no effect on sale price.   8
Table 1 reports summary statistics.  Figure 1 shows the fraction of sellers using a broker 
by year.  Notice that the proportion of brokered transactions remained quite low through the 
1980s and early 1990s, but rose steadily from 1996 through 2006, at which point it hit 59.5%.  It 
then fell sharply once the first version of this paper was circulated. 
The relatively small size of our data sample (788 usable observations out of 1,064 total 
transactions) is a potential concern, and to some degree it limits our investigation.  For example, 
we could not successfully estimate a model with buyer or seller fixed effects.  Even so, we were 
able to evaluate the potential importance of household heterogeneity diagnostically, and our 
sample is sufficiently large to generate reasonably precise estimates for the specifications we do 
present. 
Before turning our attention to estimates, it is important to discuss the representativeness 
of the setting.  Given the focus of our study, the critical question is whether the setting is repre-
sentative in terms of the magnitudes of agency costs on the one hand, and the benefits of brokers’ 
knowledge and expertise on the other.  While acknowledging that homeowners in our sample are 
well-educated and affluent relative to the general population, we see no reason to think that this 
group is either particularly susceptible or resistant to agency problems, conditional upon socio-
economic status.  The real question is whether there are special features of Stanford housing 
transactions that limit the benefits of using a broker. 
If the residential section of the Stanford campus constituted a small, insular housing mar-
ket, there might well be legitimate cause for concern.  However, there is in fact a high degree of 
fluidity between on-campus and off-campus housing.  A substantial fraction of faculty members 
choose to live off-campus in surrounding communities, and the prices of on-campus housing 
have historically tracked off-campus prices.  Thus, Stanford housing is more properly viewed as 
a neighborhood than as a market. 
Another possible concern is that the benefits of brokerage services aimed at finding and 
screening potential buyers are abnormally low on the Stanford campus due to the fact that the set 
of eligible purchasers is relatively small.  Here it is important to distinguish between the services 
provided by buyers’ agents and sellers’ agents, and to note that buyers’ brokers are the ones who 
generally provide the services in question.  While it is true that the benefits of services provided 
by buyers’ brokers are likely much smaller on the Stanford campus than in the typical residential 
real estate market, it is also true that unbundling MLS listings in the latter markets would not de-  9
prive FSBO sellers of those benefits.  With unbundled MLS listings, a FSBO seller would still be 
free to offer buyers’ agents the same commissions they currently receive for locating and pre-
screening successful buyers.  Accordingly, while this second concern identifies a dimension 
along which Stanford housing transactions are somewhat atypical, it is not a dimension that 
renders the effect of using a seller’s broker unrepresentative of markets with unbundled listing 
services.   
A third possible concern is that the benefits of a brokers’ knowledge of the market may 
be abnormally low on the Stanford campus.  This concern would be valid if homeowners on the 
Stanford campus had access to better information about recent comparable transactions than sel-
lers in typical residential real estate markets.  In fact, during the relevant time period local papers 
in surrounding communities published essentially the same information concerning listings and 
transactions that was available through the Stanford FSH Office (and such information has be-
come even more accessible with the emergence of websites such as zillow.com and redfin.com).  
There is also no reason to think that Stanford homeowners have greater personal knowledge of 
transactions involving nearby homes than homeowners in any other neighborhood.   Finally, 
even if homeowners in typical markets were less informed than Stanford homeowners, they 
could easily erase that gap at relatively low cost by engaging professional appraisers.  Thus, the 
extent to which our estimates understate the net benefits of using a seller’s broker as a conse-
quence of this particular concern is bounded by the typical appraisal fee. 
A fourth possible concern is that the benefits of using a sellers’ broker may be abnormal-
ly low on the Stanford campus because, for historical reasons, there is no stigma associated with 
FSBO sales.  In our view, this consideration constitutes a virtue of studying Stanford housing 
transactions rather than a concern.  The stigma associated with FSBO transactions in typical 
markets is an artifact of the conditions that have rendered those transactions so uncommon.  To 
the extent the unbundling of MLS services render FSBO transactions more viable, one would 
expect that stigma to dissipate over time.  The Stanford experience provides a rare window 
through which one can observe and compare FSBO and brokered outcomes when the two home-
selling strategies have been allowed to operate on a more equal institutional footing for a signifi-
cant period of time. 
We close our discussion of representativeness by noting that, in our sample, the uncondi-
tional average selling price is 43 percent higher for homes sold through brokers than for FSBO   10
homes.
22   That figure lines up remarkably well with the national average.  According to the Na-
tional Association of Realtors (2002), the median selling price of homes sold through brokers is 
37 percent higher than that of FSBO homes.   
 
3. SELLING PRICES 
  First we examine the relationship between the log selling price and the use of a broker.  
Table 2 contains OLS regression results, reported with robust standard errors, clustered at the 
home level. Specification (1) includes only a broker dummy and year effects.  The coefficient of 
the broker dummy (0.357) implies that brokered homes sold for approximately 43 percent more 
on average than homes sold without brokers.  The difference is highly statistically significant, 
with a t-statistic of more than 5.  
Naturally, the broker coefficient in specification (1) tells us nothing about the effect of 
using a broker on a home’s selling price.  As a first step toward measuring that effect, we control 
for the characteristics of a home that are correlated both with the home’s value and with the like-
lihood that it is listed through a broker.  Specification (2) adds the home characteristics discussed 
in Section 2, as well as dummy variables for eight Stanford neighborhoods.  Notice that the coef-
ficient of the broker dummy drops to 0.0009 with a standard error of 0.0232; it is both economi-
cally negligible and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the usual commission in the Stanford housing market has fallen over time from 6 percent to 5 
percent; to cover even a 5 percent commission, the use of a broker would need to increase a 
home’s selling price by 5.26 percent, which corresponds to a broker coefficient of 0.0513.  Nota-
bly, we can confidently reject the hypothesis that the broker coefficient equals 0.0513 (p-value = 
0.030).  Other coefficients generally have the expected sign. 
Specification (3) adds a measure of the length of time the seller had lived in the home 
prior to listing it for sale (as well as its square).  Adding this variable reduces the size of our 
sample from 755 to 691.  The broker coefficient rises a bit to 0.0203, with a standard error of 
0.0238.  The measured effect is now larger economically, but still less than half of the standard 
broker’s commission, and it remains statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional le-
vels of confidence.  We can no longer reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is 0.0513 at con-
ventional levels of confidence (here, the p-value is 0.194); consequently, on the basis of this es-
                                                 
22 See specification (1) in Table 1.     11
timate, we cannot rule out the possibility that brokers pay for themselves.  The difference be-
tween the broker coefficient in specifications (2) and (3) is partly attributable to the smaller sam-
ple size. 
In interpreting our estimates of specifications (2) and (3), one should bear in mind that 
the use of a broker may be correlated with unobserved factors that influence transactions prices.  
Such factors fall into two main categories: characteristics of the home and characteristics of the 
seller.  We experimented with a number of potential instruments, including the recent incidence 
of brokered sales within a home’s neighborhood and among members of the seller’s academic 
division.  Unfortunately, none of the instruments we examined had a great deal of explanatory 
power.  As a result, the associated IV estimates were imprecise and unstable.  One instrument did 
have explanatory power in the first stage: the use of a particular university loan program that in-
cidentally subsided brokers’ commissions upon sale in certain situations.  The second-stage point 
estimates of the key parameter were consistent with those reported in Table 2, but the standard 
errors were large. We were therefore compelled to address these concerns through different me-
thods.  
A. Unobserved characteristics of homes 
Many aspects of home quality are, of course, observable to sellers, buyers, and brokers, 
but unobservable to us.  The sharp contrast between the broker coefficients in specifications (1) 
and (2) indicates that the use of a broker is positively correlated with observed characteristics 
that enhance a home’s value.  For example, larger homes are more likely to sell through brokers 
than smaller homes.  Since brokers earn more from the sale of more valuable homes, this pattern 
is consistent with their incentives, and may reflect targeted efforts to obtain valuable listings.  If 
the same pattern holds for unobserved characteristics that contribute to a home’s value, then spe-
cifications (2) and (3) will tend to overstate the effect of using a broker on a home’s selling price. 
Many of the relevant unobserved characteristics of a home – location, views, architectural 
style, and so forth – remain reasonably stable over time.  In specification (4), we immunize our 
estimates against the influence of such unobserved characteristics by including home fixed ef-
fects.  This strategy is feasible because our sample period covers a reasonable long period of 
time (27 years), during which many homes were sold multiple times. Our 755 observations per-
tain to 466 separate homes.  Of those, 277 were sold once during our sample period, 116 were 
sold twice, 51 were sold three times, and 22 were sold four or more times.  In total, there are 478   12
observations on the 189 homes that were sold multiple times.  Due to the regime shift that oc-
curred during the 1990s, virtually all of the early sales occurred without brokers, while the later 
sales were fairly evenly split between brokered transactions and FSBOs (see Figure 1).  There-
fore, the sample provides good opportunities to, in effect, compare the changes in selling prices 
for homes that transitioned from FSBO to brokers with the changes in selling prices for homes 
that remained FSBOs. 
With home fixed effects included (specification (4) in Table 2), the broker coefficient 
falls to -0.0603 with a standard error of 0.036 (implying a price impact of -5.9 percent). The 
measured effect is now negative and significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence lev-
el (p = 0.096), consistent with the hypothesis that brokers have incentives to expedite sales, even 
at a lower price. We also decisively reject the hypothesis that the brokers pay for themselves, i.e., 
that broker coefficient equals 0.0513.  Notice that for this specification, many of the other control 
variables are absorbed into the home fixed effect.
23 
Specifications (1) through (4) do not allow for the possibility that the prices of different 
types of homes may evolve differently over time.  If, for example, the prices of high-end homes 
were falling (rising) over time relative to those of low-end homes (as a result of, say, shifts in the 
distribution of income), then the observed concentration of brokered sales among high-end 
homes during the latter portion of our sample period would imply that the broker coefficient is 
biased downward (upward).  To examine this possibility, we estimated a probit regression ex-
plaining the likelihood that the seller used a broker as a function of all time-invariant home cha-
racteristics plus year dummies.  We used the estimated equation to compute fitted probabilities 
(propensity scores) for each home in a fixed year (2000).  Finally, we re-estimated specification 
(4), adding interactions between this propensity score and each of the year dummies (specifica-
tion (5) in Table 2).  This specification allows for the possibility that the prices of the types of 
homes sold through brokers evolved differently over time than the prices of the types of homes 
sold without brokers, and it places minimal structure on the manner in which those paths dif-
fered. To account for the fact that propensity scores are estimated, we bootstrap the standard er-
rors. 
                                                 
23 Though home renovations can lead to changes in certain variables such as the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, 
and square footage, such changes are relatively rare in our data, and their effects are not usefully identified.   13
The coefficients of the year-propensity interaction terms (not shown in the table) exhibit 
a general tendency to rise over time, which implies that the coefficient of the broker indicator in 
specification (4) is likely biased upward.  Indeed, the coefficient of the broker indicator in speci-
fication (5) is -0.0782, implying a price impact of -7.5 percent.  The negative price effect is even 
larger (in absolute value) than the corresponding effect in specification (4), and it is significantly 
different from zero at a higher level of confidence (p = 0.0361).  Specification (6) is the same as 
(5), except that we also control for the amount of time the owner lived in the home (by adding 
linear and quadratic terms), which as before reduces our sample size.  The coefficient of the bro-
ker indicator changes only slightly to 0.0796, implying a price impact of -7.7 percent.  We reject 
the hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero at a similar level of confidence (p = 0.035).  
Variants of specifications (5) and (6) that use propensity scores constructed from estimates of a 
simple linear probability model rather than a probit regression yield similar results. 
The disadvantage of using a fitted propensity score is that it introduces additional estima-
tion error and thereby reduces precision.  An alternative is to allow for differential time trends by 
interacting the year dummies with a single aspect of home quality.  Typically, that strategy does 
indeed yield sharper estimates, and we reject the hypothesis that the broker coefficient is equal to 
zero at an even higher level of confidence.  Focusing on specification (6), the broker coefficient 
is −0.0573 (s.e. = 0.0244, p = 0.019) when we use square feet as our measure of home quality,  
−0.1032 (s.e. = 0.0276, p=0.000) when we use acreage, and −0.0723 (s.e. = 0.0333, p = 0.029) 
when we use the number of bedrooms. 
The possibility remains that the quality of a given home may have varied over time, and 
that short-term variations in quality may be correlated with the use of a broker.  We have seen, 
however, that brokers tend to sell higher quality homes, and that as a result improvements in our 
controls for quality tend to reduce the broker coefficient.  Consequently, it would appear unlikely 
that such considerations explain why the measured effect is negative. 
B. Unobserved characteristics of sellers 
Each seller chooses whether to engage a broker.  Consequently, the use of a broker may 
be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the seller that influence the selling price.  Con-
ceptually, the direction of the resulting bias is unclear.  A seller who is more concerned about his 
net yield (and who is therefore more likely to obtain a higher price with or without a broker) may 
be either more or less likely to use a broker, depending on whether he finds brokers’ claims cred-  14
ible.  A seller who has more confidence in his own negotiating abilities may be less likely to use 
a broker, as well as more likely to obtain a higher price, unless his confidence is unwarranted.
24 
If unobserved seller characteristics are reasonably stable over time, then it would be poss-
ible in principle to remove their influence by including seller fixed effects.  Unfortunately, only 
166 observations in our sample involved sellers who sold at least one other home.  After control-
ling for seller fixed effects and home characteristics, too few degrees of freedom remain to 
measure the broker coefficient with useful precision. 
The available data do, however, permit us to conduct an informative diagnositc investiga-
tion of seller heterogeneity.  First we examine correlations between fitted residuals across obser-
vations involving the same household.  If unobserved heterogeneity manifests itself in the form 
of household fixed effects (e.g., some individual is a particularly effective negotiator or consis-
tently more sensitive to price), we would expect to observe a strong positive correlation between 
the residuals for pairs of observations where the same household is on the same side of both 
transactions (i.e., it is the buyer in both instances or the seller in both instances), and a strong 
negative correlation between the residuals for pairs of observations where the same household is 
on opposite sides of the two transactions (i.e., the buyer in one instance and the seller in the oth-
er).  Based on specification (2) in Table 2, we find that residuals are effectively uncorrelated 
across pairs of observations where the same household is the buyer in both instances (ρ = 0.033,  
s.e. = 0.103, N = 65), negatively correlated across pairs of observations where the same house-
hold is the seller in both instances (ρ = -0.112, s.e. = 0.090, N = 76), and positively correlated 
across pairs of observations where the same household is the seller in one instance and the buyer 
in the other (ρ = 0.078, s.e. = 0.074, N = 136).
25  Thus, there is no evidence that selling prices 
depend on persistent household heterogeneity. 
The possibility remains that a household’s decision to use a broker may be spuriously re-
lated to transitory changes in its economic status or preferences.  For example, if the inclination 
to engage a broker is negatively correlated with the inclination to negotiate aggressively (e.g., 
                                                 
24 A substantial body of evidence suggests that people tend to be overconfident (see, e.g., Ehrlinger and Dunning, 
2003, or Meer & Van Wesep, 2007).  Those with low competence are particularly likely to overestimate their abili-
ties (see, e.g., Kruger and Dunning, 1999). 
25 Because the correlations between these fitted residuals depend on fitted coefficients, we bootstrapped the standard 
errors for the correlation coefficients.  Using residuals created by specification (3) and specification (4) results in 
qualitatively similar correlations.    15
because short-term financial pressure reduces the first inclination and enhances the second), then 
the estimates of brokers’ effects on selling prices in Table 2 are presumably biased downward.   
To investigate that possibility, we ask whether sellers who use brokers obtain better terms 
when acting as buyers than sellers who do not use brokers.  In our sample, we have 125 observa-
tions (the “paired buyer sample”) for which the buyer is a seller in some other paired observation 
(the “paired seller sample”).  Of the 125 transactions in the paired seller sample, 108 did not in-
volve brokers while 17 did.  While the latter group is quite small, it provides a meaningful basis 
for some comparisons.  Notably, more than 61 percent of the buyer/seller observation pairs (77 
of 125) involve transactions separated by less than 12 months.  Typically, these are cases in 
which a household moved from one campus home to another.  Presumably, any factor – whether 
permanent or transitory – that enhances a household’s proclivity to negotiate aggressively when 
acting as a seller creates a similar proclivity when the household acts as a buyer in a roughly con-
temporaneous transaction. 
To gauge the buyer’s success at negotiating the terms of each deal, we compute the dis-
count received from the (log) asking price; i.e., 
Discount = log(asking price) - log(selling price) 
 
Our strategy is to compare the magnitudes of discounts across the following three groups: 
 
Group A: the observation belongs to the paired buyer sample and the buyer 
used a broker when acting as a seller in the paired seller observation 
 
Group B: the observation belongs to the paired buyer sample and the buyer 
did not use a broker when acting as a seller in the paired seller observation 
 
Group C: the observation does not belong to the paired buyer sample 
 
If those who use brokers are more aggressive or effective negotiators than those who do not, we 
should observe the largest discounts on average in group A, the second largest in group C (which 
is not selected based on broker usage), and the smallest in group B.  If those who use brokers are 
less aggressive or effective negotiators than those who do not, that ranking should be reversed.  
Using our full sample, we regress the discount on two dummy variables, one for group A 
observations and the other for group C observations, as well as year and home fixed effects (to 
control for the likely possibility that discounts vary systematically over time and across types of   16
homes).
26  The estimated value of the group A coefficient is 0.0227 (s.e. = 0.0275).  The point 
estimate implies that the types of households who employ brokers when acting as sellers tend to 
be more aggressive and effective negotiators when acting as buyers than those who do not.  The 
estimated value of the group C coefficient is 0.000589 (s.e. =  0.0181).  The point estimate indi-
cates that, when acting as buyers, households who do not employ brokers in other transactions 
where they act as sellers tend to be slightly less effective negotiators than the group C house-
holds, who are not selected based on whether they used brokers in other transactions where they 
sold campus homes.  Thus, group A receives the largest discounts on average, group C the 
second largest, and group B the smallest by a slim margin, but the differences are extremely 
small and statistically significant. 
We also estimate a second specification in which we control for the home’s initial asking 
price (in logs) in addition to all the aforementioned variables.   The asking price potentially acts 
as a proxy for considerations that may systematically influence the discount the buyer receives, 
such as transitory elements of home quality that are not subsumed by the fixed effect, or the de-
gree to which the property is overpriced.  With this variable added, the estimated value of the 
group A coefficient is -0.00692 (s.e. = 0.0311), while the estimated value of the group C coeffi-
cient is -0.00569 (s.e. = 0.0171).  Thus, from this specification it appears that group B receives 
the largest discounts on average, group C the second largest, and group A the smallest, but the 
differences are tiny both economically and statistically.   
We see no basis in these results for an inference that those who use brokers are signifi-
cantly less aggressive or effective negotiators than those who do not, and hence no grounds for 
concern that that the estimates of broker effects in Table 2 are biased downward.  While we ac-
knowledge that our ability to draw definitive conclusions is limited by small group sizes (particu-
larly for group A), which reduces precision, we note that the 95% confidence interval for the ne-
gotiating efficacy differential between groups A and B does not contain differentials large 
enough to offset the estimated broker effects from specifications (5) or (6) in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
26 The regression employs 755 observations, of which 277 are effectively dummied out by the home fixed effects 
(i.e., the correspond to homes for which we have only one observation).   17
4. INITIAL ASKING PRICES 
  In this section we examine the possibility that brokers influence transaction prices in part 
by encouraging sellers to set lower initial asking prices.  We estimate the same six specifications 
as in Table 2, except that we use the log of the initial asking price as the dependent variable.  Re-
sults appear in Table 3.  Not surprisingly, specification (1), which includes only a broker dummy 
and year effects, indicates that initial asking prices tend to be significantly higher for homes that 
are sold through brokers than for those that are not.  Specification (2) controls for the home cha-
racteristics discussed in Section 2, as well as for neighborhood effects.  Notice that the coeffi-
cient of the broker dummy becomes negative (-0.0265, s.e. = 0.0219).  Although the point esti-
mate is economically significant, we cannot rule out the possibility that the true effect is zero.  
The addition of controls for the length of time the seller has lived in the home (specification (3), 
which is based on a smaller sample) moves the coefficient toward zero (-0.00760, s.e. = 0.0238).  
However, with home fixed effects (specification (4)), the broker coefficient becomes considera-
bly more negative and significant, both economically and statistically (-0.0614, s.e. = 0.0325).  
Adding interactions between the brokerage propensity score and the year dummies (specification 
(5)) does not noticeably alter that finding: the broker coefficient falls slightly to -0.0639 (s.e. = 
0.0338).  For specifications (4) and (5), the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 
roughly the 94% level of confidence.  However, adding controls for the seller’s tenure in the 
home on top of the interaction terms (specification (6), also based on a smaller sample) mod-
erates the measured effect (-0.0401, s.e. = 0.0320). Notably, the size of the estimated effects on 
initial asking price and sale price are roughly comparable in most specifications.  Though the es-
timates are not sufficiently precise to permit a definitive inference, they suggest that much of the 
effect of brokers on selling prices may reflect their influence on asking prices.  
 
5. TIME ON THE MARKET 
  Does the use of a broker lead the homeowner to sell his or her home more quickly?  To 
address this question, we estimate the same six specifications as Tables 2 and 3, except that we 
use the log of the amount of time on the market (between initial listing and sale) as the dependent 
variable.  Results appear in Table 4.  In specification (1), which controls only for year effects, the 
coefficient of the broker dummy is –0.192 (s.e. = 0.081), which implies that brokered homes sell   18
17.5 percent faster than homes that are not brokered.  That difference is significant both econom-
ically and statistically.  Adding controls for home characteristics and Stanford neighborhoods has 
a relatively minor effect on the estimated coefficient (-0.168) and its standard error (0.088).  
When we add controls for the seller’s tenure in the home, we find that brokered homes sell about 
19 percent faster than homes that are not brokered (the coefficient of the broker dummy is –
0.211, and its standard deviation is 0.093); evaluated at the mean of our sample, this finding im-
plies that brokered homes are sold nearly 1.9 months more quickly than non-brokered homes.  
However, with home fixed effects, the measured effect is much smaller – only 5.7 percent (the 
coefficient is -0.0651) – and no longer statistically significant (the standard deviation is 0.112).  
Adding interactions between the brokerage propensity score and the year dummies (specification 
(5)) weakens the effect further: the broker coefficient falls to -0.0448 (s.e. = 0.134).  However, 
adding controls for the seller’s tenure in the home on top of the interaction terms (specification 
(6), also based on a smaller sample) restores the effect, albeit at a reduced level of statistical sig-
nificance (-0.191, s.e. = 0.142).   
When the homeowner is a reluctant seller, a home can remain on the market for an ex-
tended period of time.  Such sellers may also be disinclined to use brokers, who they know will 
seek quick sales.  The effects discussed in the previous paragraph are not, however, attributable 
to such considerations.  For example, when the sample is limited to homes selling within twelve 
months (n = 595), the coefficient of the broker dummy in specification (2) remains reasonably 
similar: -0.183 (s.e. = 0.067).  Further limiting the sample to those selling within six months (n = 
463) yields a coefficient of -0.179 (s.e. = 0.061).  
We can obtain additional insights concerning the effect of using a broker on time-to-sale 
by examining monthly hazard rates.  Specifically, we estimate a series of probit models describ-
ing the probability of selling a home during the t-th month after placing it on the market, condi-
tional on reaching the start of that month without a sale.  Column (1) of Table 5 reports the mar-
ginal effects of using a broker – in other words, the impact on the probability of a sale.  To con-
serve space, we have omitted the coefficients for other variables, which include a full set of 
home characteristics, neighborhood effects, and year effects.  The results indicate that the use of 
a broker is associated with a slightly higher probability of sale during the first month on the mar-
ket (0.0253, s.e. = 0.0160, p = 0.070), and a substantially higher probability during the second   19
month (0.175, s.e. = 0.056, p = 0.00).
 27  Beyond the second month, there is no clear pattern.  The 
measured effects are positive and reasonably large in the third and sixth months, but not statisti-
cally significant.  However, they are negative, large, and statistically significant in the fourth and 
fifth months.  Thus, to the extent the use of a broker reduces time-to-sale, the effect appears to 
involves quick sales (i.e., within two months) rather than persistently elevated probabilities.   
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 reports the cumulative probability of a sale for the aver-
age home in our sample, conditional on using or not using a broker, implied by the probit regres-
sions shown in column (1).  Notice that the use of a broker raises the cumulative probability for 
every month.  As a result of the inversion of relative hazard rates in the fourth and fifth months, 
the probability of selling a home without a broker nearly catches up with the probability of sell-
ing a home with a broker by the end of the fifth month, but these probabilities diverge once again 
in the sixth month. 
Thus, we conclude that brokered homes likely sell somewhat faster than similar homes 
that are not brokered, owing mostly to an increased likelihood of sale within the first two months 
after being placed on the market.  We note, however, that the specifications with home fixed ef-
fects yield ambiguous results. 
 
6. SENSITIVITY 
  The qualitative results reported in this paper are robust with respect to a wide range of 
alternative specifications.  Here we briefly summarize some of the alternatives we examined.  
Full results are available upon request.   
  Variations in market conditions.  Our basic specifications control for variations in market 
conditions through the inclusion of year effects.  We also estimated specifications with seasonal 
effects, half-year indicators, and quarterly indicators.  Seasonal effects are marginally significant 
in some specifications but change the estimated effect of using a broker only slightly, as do half-
year and quarterly indicators.   
Buyer and seller characteristics.  Additional characteristics of buyers and sellers, includ-
ing age and departmental affiliation, are available for most observations.  To preserve sample 
                                                 
27 Due to the inclusion of year effects, all observations within a given year are dropped if all of the associated homes 
either sold or failed to sale within a given month after listing.  That is why the sample size is smaller for the first 
month after listing than for the second month after listing.    20
size, we did not include those variables in our basic specification.  Adding them sacrifices some 
precision, but does not meaningfully alter our findings, even though the coefficients of the addi-
tional variables are sometimes statistically significant individually and/or jointly.  
Data from 2007 and 2008.  As noted in the introduction, the frequency with which buyers 
used brokers dropped sharply from 2006 to 2007 after we circulated an early version of this pa-
per through the FSH Office.  Though we see no reason to suspect that this development would 
impart any particular bias, it is nevertheless arguable that the data from January 2007 through 
January 2008 are somehow contaminated.  The coefficients of interest change slightly when 
those observations are removed from the sample, but our conclusions are qualitatively unaltered. 
Heterogeneity across brokers. Different people may respond differently to the incentives 
present in principal-agent problems. It is therefore of interest to determine whether the effects of 
brokerage are reasonably uniform, or if they differ across companies and agents.
 28   One compa-
ny handled 54 of the 133 brokered sales in our sample, and another handled 39.  One broker with 
the first company accounted for 34 transactions, and another broker with the second company 
accounted for 25.  Accordingly, we re-estimated various specifications with additional dummy 
variables, either for the two lead companies or for the two lead brokers.  The results suggest that 
the effects of interest may indeed differ across some brokers.  In particular, both the selling price 
and the initial asking price tended to be noticeably higher when one particular broker handled 
transactions, and those differences were significant both economically and statistically.  In speci-
fications otherwise analogous to equation (2) in Tables 2 and 3, the estimated impact on selling 
price for the broker in question is 0.0856 (s.e. = 0.0374), and the estimated impact on list price is 
0.0509 (s.e. = 0.0390).  Otherwise, broker effects on both asking prices and selling prices were 
fairly uniform.  In addition, the acceleration of sales appears to be almost entirely attributable to 
transactions handled by the two lead companies. With company dummies added to specification 
(2) in Table 4, the main broker effect becomes positive and statistically insignificant (0.0970, s.e. 
= 0.119).  In contrast, the coefficients of the two company indicators are large and negative (-
0.560, s.e. = 0.168, and -0.309, s.e. = 0.167).  Possibly the companies with the most experience 
in this particular market have an advantage in selling homes quickly.   
 
                                                 
28 Notably, Palmon and Sopranzetti (2008) find that broker quality matters in the sale of a home.   21
7. CONCLUSION 
 
We have employed a unique data set to examine the separate effects of real estate broker-
age services provided to sellers, other than MLS listings, on a home’s selling price, initial asking 
price, and time on the market.  Because a seller presumably benefits from an MLS listing, mea-
suring the effects of real estate brokerage services including MLS listings (as a number of other 
studies have done) likely obscures the significance of agency costs.  Our central finding is that a 
seller’s use of a broker reduces the selling price of the typical home by 5.9 to 7.7 percent, which 
is consistent with the presence of a fairly severe principal-agent problem.  Those estimates are 
statistically significant, and are obtained from specifications that include home fixed effects; 
some also allow for the possibility that prices may have changed over time at different rates in 
different market segments (e.g., that the prices of high-end homes, which are more frequently 
sold through brokers, may have risen or fallen relative to those of low-end homes).  We find no 
evidence that the lower prices received by sellers who use brokers are attributable to correlations 
with unobserved household characteristics such as preferences or negotiation skills.  Our analysis 
also suggests somewhat more tentatively that a seller’s use of a broker may reduce the initial ask-
ing price and accelerate the sale.   These results are of direct relevance to the recent policy debate 
over the traditional practice of bundling MLS listings with other brokerage services.  They sug-
gest that bundling may indeed compel many homeowners to purchase unwanted services (other 
than MLS listings) contrary to their interests.     22
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Selling price (2008 dollars, thousands)  795.80  659.48  507.82  162.34  3089.22 
Initial asking price (2008 dollars, thousands)  855.38  712.95 562.65 168.83  4422.72 
Months between initial listing and close of 
escrow  9.79 5  14.89  1 217 
Whether the seller used a broker  0.176  0  0.381  0  1 
Age of the home at the date of initial listing 
(in years).  26.65 22.27 18.30  2.08  98.6 
Time seller had lived in the home at the date 
of initial listing (in years)  14.31 9.21 12.82  0.605  60.13 
Whether the home has a study.  0.364  0  0.482  0  1 
Number of bedrooms.  3.18  3  1.16  1  7 
Number of bathrooms.  2.48  2  0.7002  1  5.5 
Whether the home has a pool.  0.555  1  0.497  0  1 
Square footage of the home.  2002  1931  797.0  638  6168 
Size of the lot (in acres).  0.203  0.24  0.237  0  1.41 
Whether the home was sold through an estate.  0.056  0  0.2294  0  1 
Buyer’s  age  43.5 41 11.2 24  89 
Seller’s  age  58.3 56 17.9 28 105 
 
 Table 2: OLS Regressions for Log Selling Price (2008 dollars) 
 
Variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Home fixed ef-
fects  No No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Year  effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood  
effects  No Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A 
Year-Propensity 
interactions   No  No No No Yes  Yes 











































Time in home  -  -  -0.0066 
(0.0021)  - -  -0.0014 
(0.0043) 
Time in home 
squared  - -  9.74x10
-5 
(4.30x10




Study -  0.0381 
(0.0160) 
0.0376 
(0.0167)  - - - 
Bedrooms -  0.0207 
(0.0140) 
0.0286 
(0.0164)  - - - 
Baths -  0.0446 
(0.0177) 
0.0300 
(0.0191)  - - - 
Pool -  0.0607 
(0.0278) 
0.0481 
(0.0279)  - - - 







-5)  - - - 
Square feet 





-8   
(1.23x10
-8)  - - - 










Acreage -  0.532 
(0.297) 
0.463 
(0.331)  - - - 
Acreage squared  -  -0.360 
(0.202) 
-0.283 
(0.207)  - - - 
Observations  755  755 691 755 755 691 
R
2  0.255  0.928 0.937 0.818 0.888 0.907 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the home level are reported.  Standard errors for specifications (4) and (5) are bootstrapped 
with 2000 repetitions to account for the estimated propensity score. Specifications (4) and (5) include 277 observations that are 
dummied out; specification (6) includes 270 such observations. The R
2 for the fixed-effects regression pertains to “within” variation.   2
Table 3: OLS Regressions for Log Asking Price (2008 dollars) 
 
Variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Home fixed ef-
fects  No No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Year  effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood  
effects  No Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A 
Year-Propensity 
interactions   No  No No No Yes  Yes 











































Time in home  -  -  -0.0050 
(0.0024)  - -  0.0023 
(0.0037) 
Time in home 
squared  - -  7.86x10
-5 
(4.76x10




Study -  0.0547 
(0.0189) 
0.0486 
(0.0173)  - - - 
Bedrooms -  0.0328 
(0.0172) 
0.0292 
(0.0183)  - - - 
Baths -  0.0380 
(0.0189) 
0.0258 
(0.0209)  - - - 
Pool -  0.0814 
(0.0304) 
0.0765 
(0.0312)  - - - 







-4)  - - - 
Square feet 
squared  -  -3.76x10




-8   
(1.67x10
-8)  - - - 










Acreage -  0.285 
(0.326) 
0.385 
(0.326)  - - - 
Acreage squared  -  -0.0356 
(0.221) 
-0.0395 
(0.213)  - - - 
Observations  755  755 691 755 755 691 
R
2  0.216  0.914 0.927 0.777 0.869 0.897 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the home level are reported.  Standard errors for specifications (4) and (5) are bootstrapped 
with 2000 repetitions to account for the estimated propensity score. Specifications (4) and (5) include 277 observations that are 
dummied out; specification (6) includes 270 such observations. The R
2 for the fixed-effects regression pertains to “within” variation.   3
Table 4: OLS Regressions for Log Time on Market 
 
Variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Home fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood  
effects  No Yes  Yes  N/A  N/A N/A 
Year-Propensity 
interactions   No  No No No Yes  Yes 










































Time in home  -  -  0.05483 
(0.009159)  - -  0.02634 
(0.0168) 
Time in home-
squared  - -  -1.11x10
-3 
(1.87x10




Study -  0.122 
(0.0667) 
0.0548 
(0.0716)  - - - 
Bedrooms - 0.0721 
(0.0465) 
0.0262 
(0.0504)  - - - 
Baths -  -0.0107 
(0.0712) 
-0.0201 
(0.0775)  - - - 
Pool -  -0.0011 
(0.109) 
0.0455 
(0.119)  - - - 







-4)  -  - - 
Square feet squared  -  1.50x10




-7   
(4.67x10
-8)  -  - - 










Acreage -  -0.0020 
(1.012) 
0.3469 
(1.207)  -  - - 
Acreage squared  -  0.635 
(0.712) 
0.516 
(0.896)  -  - - 
Observations  755  755 691 755 755 691 
R
2  0.300  0.379 0.422 0.723 0.744 0.763 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the home level are reported.  Standard errors for specifications (4) and (5) are bootstrapped 
with 2000 repetitions to account for the estimated propensity score. Specifications (4) and (5) include 277 observations that are 
dummied out; specification (6) includes 270 such observations. The R
2 for the fixed-effects regression pertains to “within” variation.   4
 
Table 5: Probit Models for 
Probability of Sale 
 
 




Number of  
Observations 
(1) 
Estimated Impact of Broker 
on Probability of Sale, Given 
No Previous Sale 
(2) 
Fitted Cumulative 
Probability of Sale if 
No Broker Used 
(3) 
Fitted Cumulative 
Probability of Sale if 
Broker Used 





































The left hand side variable is a dummy for selling in the tth month conditional on not having sold up to that point. Other 
right hand side variables include home characteristics, neighborhood effects, and year effects.  Robust standard errors 
clustered at the home level are reported in parentheses. Marginal probability effects evaluated at the means of the expla-
natory variables are reported in column (1). 
 